The ICC appears to have been somewhat conservative in extending intellectual property rights to companies that impose vertical restrictions. First, the ICC appears to have interpreted the “reasonable” and “necessary” conditions very strictly and refused to extend the benefit of the IP exemption to vertical restrictions if the institution imposing such restrictions could protect its intellectual property rights through a less restrictive method. Second, the ICC read the textual text of the intellectual property exemption and refused to grant the benefit of the intellectual property exemption if the law was not strictly marked by the six provisions of the Competition Act covered by Section 3, paragraph 5, of the Competition Act. To our knowledge, the ICC has not, under any particular circumstances, considered a limitation of the resale price. Since restrictions on resale pricing are reviewed after reviewing the rules of the basic review, the IAB is required to take into account the resulting efficiency gains. In vertical restriction decisions, the ICC has generally taken into account factors such as low market share, limited duration of vertical restrictions and brand protection in order to deny the likelihood of market lockdown (Himalya International Ltd/Himalya Simplot Pvt Ltd (Case 92 of 2013). Shubham Sanitary Wares v HSIL Limited (Case 9 of 2015); and Ashish Ahuja vs. (Case 17 of 2014) (Snapdeal). The ICC may prohibit a minimum aspiration requirement as a vertical restriction if it is or is likely to be the origin of the CEAA in India. To our knowledge, the ICC does not yet appear to have addressed the minimum barrier requirements as a vertical restriction.

However, these obligations were considered in the context of the abuse of dominance provisions. For example, in the in Re Faridabad Industries Association and in the Adani Gas Limited (Case 71 of 2012), the ICC assessed whether a minimum duty of control constituted an abusive clause for the purchaser. While the ICC appreciated various commercial justifications for such contractual clauses, it found that the requirement on the purchaser to meet these minimum obligations, even in the event of an emergency termination, rendered the term “unfair” and therefore abusive. When it is confirmed that the contracting parties operate at different commercial levels within the meaning of an agreement and that the agreement has an “impact on trade”, the procedure for assessing the vertical agreement under Article 101 of the TFUE is, Overall, while the Competition Act does not impose specific rules for agency agreements, the ban on vertical restrictions applies to all companies operating at different stages or at different levels of the production chain. To our knowledge, the ICC still has to test the disciplines on vertical restrictions until an agent-principle agreement. Vertical agreements are widely accepted because they are less likely to solve competition problems than horizontal agreements. Horizontal agreements are concluded between two current or potential competitors. The ICC reviewed the limitations of the resale price in a small group of cases, but was successful in finding an infringement in only one case. In Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt Ltd and Ors v. Hyundai Motor India Limited (Case Nos. 36 and 82 of 2014) (Hyundai), the CCI sanctioned Hyundai Motor India Limited (HMIL) for the introduction of a reduced control mechanism on its dealers – allowing HMIL to prescribe the maximum discount that should be offered by its dealers. The ICC found that this restriction stifles intra-brand competition and leads to higher prices for consumers.

The ICC found that anti-competitive price restrictions could be achieved directly and indirectly, para. B example by setting the distribution margin, setting a maximum discount, granting discounts or spreading promotional costs of meeting a certain price level, linking a resale price to competitors` resale prices, or using threats, intimidation, warnings, sanctions. , delay or suspension of